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Abstract
How is the protest behavior of citizens in new democracies influenced by their ex-
perience of the past? Certain theories of political socialization hold that cohorts 
reaching political maturity under dictatorship are subject to apathy. Yet, it remains 
unclear whether mobilization during the transition can counterbalance this effect. 
This article examines the protest behavior of citizens socialized in Eastern Germany, a 
region marked by two legacies: a legacy of autocracy and, following the 1989-90 revolu-
tion, a legacy of transitional mobilization. Using age-period-cohort models with data 
from the European Social Survey, the analysis assesses the evolution of gaps in protest 
across generations and time between East and West Germans. The results demonstrate 
that participation in demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts is lower for East Germans 
socialized under communism in comparison with West Germans from the same co-
horts. This participation deficit remains stable over time and even increases for certain 
protest activities.
Keywords
political participation – protest – political socialization – democratization – Eastern 
Germany
1 Introduction
Over the recent years, many studies have examined the effect of political so-
cialization on the evolution of political attitudes and behavior of citizens of 
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new democracies. This strand of research suggests that, on the path to con-
solidation, new democracies have to overcome legacies of authoritarian so-
cialization (Mishler and Rose 2007; Neundorf 2010; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 
2017). Having grown up in a political environment that repressed private, 
civil, and political liberties, citizens of new democracies have to adjust to the 
workings of the democratic system. However, since attitudinal and behavioral 
change becomes increasingly difficult after a certain age, political socialization 
theories suggest that democratic habituation can only be completed through 
generational replacement (Mannheim 1952). In the short-term, norms and 
practices developed in the autocratic period often continue to permeate the 
political culture of new democracies.
So far, however, this literature has ignored one socialization moment in the 
political history of new democracies: the transition itself. It remains to be seen 
whether certain types of transitions from authoritarian rule can induce shifts 
in the political culture of new democracies. Democratic transitions are often 
decided behind closed doors, among elites. Yet, sometimes they are also the 
product of social movements encompassing large segments of society (della 
Porta 2014). A more optimistic perspective on legacies of political socialization 
in new democracies would consider the transformative power of bottom-up 
transitions.
Protest participation is one dimension of political culture that could be 
affected by bottom-up transitions. Before the consolidation of parties, extra-
electoral forms of participation such as demonstrations and petitions are often 
the most direct and accessible way for citizens to express their political prefer-
ences. Peaceful protest activities during a transition can function as “schools of 
democracy:” They give citizens a feeling of political empowerment, shape new 
political alliances, and crystallize networks of interest representation. Bottom-
up transitions represent a rupture with the norm of political disengagement 
nurtured by authoritarian regimes.
Building on these competing perspectives, this paper examines the effect 
of political socialization on protest participation in Eastern Germany. From 
the standpoint of traditional theories of authoritarian socialization, we would 
expect citizens who grew up under the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to 
be rather apathetic. The East German communist regime strictly limited the 
expression of political grievances. Citizens were thus socialized in a political 
environment that offered little possibility to develop the skills necessary for 
extra-electoral political activism.
Yet, we must not forget the context that led to the collapse of the GDR. The 
East German peaceful revolution represents one of the most successful epi-
sodes of mass mobilization for democracy in modern history. Without firing a 
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gunshot, ordinary people in the streets of Leipzig, Dresden, and Berlin put an 
end to forty years of dictatorship. This achievement was only possible through 
the massive involvement of East German citizens. This mobilization might 
have constituted a defining socialization moment with lasting effects on po-
litical participation.
Was the 1989-90 protest wave just a spark of political participation? Did East 
Germans move from been highly mobilized to being apathetic as predicted by 
mainstream theories of political socialization? Or did the transitional mobi-
lization have a long-term spill-over effect? Finally, how do these effects vary 
across generations?
To answer these questions, this study undertakes a systematic comparison 
of the protest participation of East and West Germans across generations and 
time. The political participation of West Germans constitutes an interesting 
benchmark to contrast the effect of radically different experiences of political 
socialization in Eastern Germany. While previous research has found diverging 
patterns of protest participation in Eastern and Western Germany (Lahusen 
and Bleckmann 2015), it is unclear whether these differences are driven by 
period or cohort effects.
This study pools data collected by the European Social Survey between 
2002 and 2017. I use cross-classified, random-effect models to disentangle age, 
period, and cohort (APC) effects on protest participation among East and West 
Germans (Yang and Land 2006). Random slopes at the cohort and period levels 
allow for an estimation of convergence between the two groups. I compare the 
participation of East and West Germans in three types of protest activities: 
attending lawful demonstrations, signing petitions, and joining in boycotts.
2 Political Socialization and Protest in New Democracies
To explain under what circumstances citizens of new democracies decide to 
join in protest activities, scholars have first sought to apply general theoretical 
approaches of protest that were developed in the West European and North 
American contexts. Grievance, resource mobilization, and opportunity struc-
ture theories have improved our understanding of social movement activity 
after democratic transitions (Gurr 1970; Kriesi et al. 1995; McCarthy and Zald 
1977). Yet, these approaches often failed to account for the specific historical 
situation of third-wave democracies. A small, but growing number of studies 
has instead looked at historical legacies as determinants of protest participa-
tion. These works attempt to explain involvement in extra-electoral political 
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actions by looking at the political context in which different generations of 
citizens were socialized.
2.1 The Legacy of Dictatorship
Scholars initially focused on how experiences with the former authoritarian 
regime affect protest participation in newly democratized societies. This ap-
proach builds on a long tradition of research in political science describing 
democratic consolidation as a process of cultural habituation. According to 
this perspective, new democracies inherit norms and practices from the for-
mer autocratic regime that are incompatible with the workings of the new 
democratic system. Scholars argue that this mismatch between political cul-
tures tainted by the experience of dictatorship and the democratic institutions 
is a fundamental challenge for the stability of new democracies (e.g., Almond 
and Verba 1963). Adjustment to the new system is said to be more problematic 
for older cohorts who reached political maturity under the previous regime 
(Mannheim 1952).
This perspective is well-established in the literature on postcommunism. 
For some authors, the experience of “living through communism” (Pop- 
Eleches and Tucker 2017) explains why, today, certain generations of citizens 
in Central and Eastern Europe are less supportive of democracy and the mar-
ket and are less involved in civic organizations, independent of other socio-
demographic and contextual factors (Mishler and Rose 2007; Neundorf 2010; 
Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2013, 2014).
There are reasons to believe that protest participation in new democracies 
follows a similar logic of “intergenerational discontinuity” (Mishler and Rose 
2007:823). As pointed out by Linz (1975), restrictions on autonomous pluralism 
are a central feature of autocracies. While traditional authoritarian regimes 
favor the “passive obedience and apathy” of their “subjects,” totalitarian re-
gimes, in contrast, monopolize and exacerbate participation through chan-
nels controlled by the political apparatus (Linz 1975:191-92). In one case or the 
other, citizens have little room to independently organize and articulate public 
demands. Individuals are socialized in a political environment in which extra-
institutional political participation imposes prohibitive costs on those who 
practice it. This legacy of dictatorship leaves no fertile ground for the routini-
zation of protest during democratic consolidation.
This pessimistic perspective resonates with empirical findings collected 
over the last years. A number of studies find that, at the aggregate level, protest 
is and remains low in new democracies (Bernhagen and Marsh 2007; Roller 
and Weßels 1996). Some scholars explain this specifically by the duration of 
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the former authoritarian regime (Bernhard and Karakoç 2007). Hooghe and 
Quintelier (2014) go a step further and measure how the participation gap be-
tween old and new democracies in Europe varies across generations. Based on 
theories of authoritarian socialization, we would expect political apathy to be 
particularly prevalent among older cohorts who grew up under state social-
ism. The authors, however, do not find significant variation in protest partici-
pation across generations. The protest deficit in new European democracies 
is not substantially lower for younger cohorts. This last finding is surprising 
and suggests a rather more complex interaction between the current political 
environment and legacies of autocracy.
2.2 The Legacy of Transitional Mobilization
So far, scholars have suggested that authoritarian regimes leave a mark on 
their citizens. According to theories of authoritarian socialization, citizens 
who grew up in an environment that restricted autonomous pluralism should 
be less inclined to join protest activities in the subsequent democratic re-
gime. By focusing only on the impact of the previous authoritarian regime, 
this literature, however, does not capture the full complexity of the political 
experience of citizens of new democracies. The democratic transition itself 
probably constitutes one additional “socialization moment” that should be 
considered.
While successful transitions are often completed in a matter of months, 
they remain emotionally charged political junctures that shape the way poli-
tics is done during democratic consolidation. When transitions are not only 
the product of “pacts” among elites, but also build on the participation of large 
social movements, they can have a more disruptive effect (Fishman 2017). 
As suggested by della Porta, “protests, particularly the intense moments of 
mobilization for democracy, are therefore understood as eventful, given their 
capacity to transform structures through relational, emotional, and cogni-
tive mechanisms” (della Porta 2016:3). Through mass mobilization, the social 
structure that was artificially flattened out under authoritarianism resurfaces 
(Weßels 2003). Protest activities allow citizens to acquire new civic skills and 
enable groups to organize themselves around common interests. A success-
ful transitional mobilization could therefore counterbalance the demobilizing 
effect of a legacy of dictatorship.
This assumption is consistent with the work of social movement scholars 
looking at the long-term cultural impact of cycles of contention. Tarrow, for 
example, affirms that “new forms of collective action develop within the 
experimental context of cycles of protest. The most successful – and the most 
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transferable – become part of the future repertoire of collective action even 
during quieter times” (Tarrow 1995:94; see also Zolberg 1972). Such “spillover” 
effects of social movements (Meyer and Whittier 1994) have long been ob-
served in the US with the cohort of baby boomers involved in the civil rights, 
anti-Vietnam war, and women’s movements (Jennings 1987; McAdam 1999). 
Young protesters in the 1960s and 1970s continued to participate for their 
lifetime. For some authors, the stability of activists’ political attitudes and 
participation over time demonstrated that protest functioned as a catalyst in 
the formation of political generations (Caren, Ghoshal, and Ribas 2011; Grasso 
2016; Quaranta 2016).
3 Eastern Germany: Two Competing Legacies
The legacies of dictatorship and transitional mobilization might have both 
influenced protest participation since 1990 in Eastern Germany. The political 
trajectory of the region illustrates how different contexts of political socializa-
tion could have engendered generational differences in protest behavior.
If, as Mannheim (1952) first suggested, historical circumstances experi-
enced early in life have a durable impact on one’s orientations, abrupt regime 
changes should be associated with generational shifts in protest behavior. In 
Eastern Germany, one would expect protest shifts to follow the lines of three 
major generations, each shaped by distinctive formative political experiences 
over the last century (Neundorf 2010:1102). People of the first generation, born 
before the 1930s, saw their adolescence and early adulthood marked by the 
failure of the Weimar Republic and the Nazi dictatorship. The generation that 
followed, that is, the people born during the 1930s, 40s, 50s, and 60s, experi-
enced early political socialization under the socialist regime of the German 
Democratic Republic, or GDR. Finally, younger citizens, who were born in the 
1970s and later reached political maturity under a reunified, democratic Ger-
many. While the historical events that formed the first and third generations 
affected the whole German society, the Cold War generation in the East took 
a different path from its counterpart in the West. The partition of the country 
marked a regional rupture in the development of extra-parliamentary political 
participation.
Whereas West Germans experienced the rise of a protest culture in the 
post-Second World War era (Rucht 1998), their fellow citizens in the East faced 
closed opportunity structures that strictly limited their capacity to express 
political dissension (Wielgohs 2008:114-23). The extensive social control 
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imposed by the “bureaucratic-authoritarian” leadership of the GDR combined 
with the specter of a Soviet intervention pushed protest to the margins of so-
ciety (Kitschelt et al. 1999:25-27; Lohmann 1994:43). For most people in East-
ern Germany, disaffection was expressed mainly in the “public-private sphere” 
(Oswald and Voronkov 2004): It developed through dense friendship networks 
or church communities, that is, small deliberative spaces where a certain free-
dom of expression existed (Wielgohs 2008:121). Political protest was not made 
public. When a wave of demonstrations erupted in 1989, it occurred spontane-
ously and was not coordinated by preexisting independent groups.
Coming back to the theory of political socialization, this would lead one 
to believe that the Cold War generation in Eastern Germany ought to be less 
prone to engage in routinized protest. A legacy of dictatorship is expected to 
translate into apathy during democratic consolidation. Empirically, this means 
that the likelihood of taking part in a protest activity should be lower for the Cold 
War generation in Eastern Germany than for the corresponding generation in 
Western Germany, after controlling for other individual characteristics.
Conversely, even though the cycle of protest that led to the fall of the com-
munist regime in Eastern Germany did not last long, it proved to be remark-
ably widespread, peaceful, and effective in bringing political change. The de-
mocratization movement started in September, 1989, as weekly peace prayers 
held in the city of Leipzig and later evolved into a series of demonstrations 
asking for political liberalization and freedom of movement. Despite serious 
threats of repression, the protests spread throughout the country (Lohmann 
1994). According to certain estimations, between September 9 and November 
13, 1989, more than 3 million people took the streets, that is, about 20% of the 
population of the GDR at the time (Opp, Voss, and Gern 1995). Demands of 
protesters – opening of the borders, resignation of leaders of the communist 
party, and, eventually, reunification – were met rapidly, making the East Ger-
man revolution one of the swiftest and steadiest in history.
The massive involvement of citizens of the former GDR is also highlighted 
by findings of social surveys. The second wave of the European Values Study 
conducted in 1990 gives a snapshot of the protest experience of East and West 
Germans in the months before reunification (EVS 2015). When asked whether 
they “have done,” “would,” or “would never” join in a lawful demonstration, 
East Germans were far more likely than West Germans at that time to de-
clare having ever taken part in a protest. In fact, among the younger cohorts, 
East Germans were twice as likely to have ever joined in a protest as shown in 
Figure 1.
Did the transitional mobilization in Eastern Germany set in motion a pro-
test culture that endured in the post-Cold War era? In light of its achievements, 
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the peaceful revolution might have marked a rupture with the legacy of dic-
tatorship. If this were to be the case, the likelihood of taking part in a protest 
activity should be higher for the Cold War generation in Eastern Germany than 
for the corresponding generation in Western Germany, after controlling for other 
individual characteristics.
4 Beyond Political Socialization: Opportunity Structures and Social 
Compositions
In order to present a more contextualized account of generational cleavages in 
extra-parliamentary political participation in Eastern Germany, it is worth 
considering two complementary explanations. So far, the most common ap-
proaches to the study of protest in a comparative perspective have been to 
look at differences in political opportunity structures and socio-demographic 
compositions of societies.
In a narrow sense, the political opportunity structure corresponds to the 
institutional context faced by protesters. As noted by Norris, this includes 
Note: Local polynomial smoothed lines with 95% CIs
Figure 1 Experience with demonstrations across cohorts in East and West Germany in 1990 
evs 2015
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“the constitutional rules of the game” in addition to “overall levels of democra-
tization” and “political rights and civil liberties” (2002:25). These institutional 
factors determine the level of openness (the input dimension) and capacity 
to respond to public demands (the output dimension) of political regimes 
(Kitschelt 1986:61-67). It is usually agreed that closed opportunity structures 
in authoritarian regimes are the most demobilizing environments for protest. 
As regimes liberalize and reduce barriers to action, protest expands. Passed 
a certain level, however, the positive linear relation between openness and 
protest becomes uncertain (Robertson 2011:19-24). Scholars have been debat-
ing whether highly inclusive and responsive political structures continue to 
further protest – albeit in less disruptive forms (Kriesi et al. 1995) – or if they 
rather encourage activists to turn to conventional modes of participation 
(Eisinger 1973; Tilly 1978).
This paper assumes that the institutional convergence after reunification 
prevents structural factors from playing a major role in regional differences. 
Contrary to other postcommunist polities, the former GDR abruptly departed 
from the model of state socialism (Ekiert and Kubik 1998:564). The top-down, 
Western-led reunification ensured that democratic institutions in the East 
were rapidly consolidated. The integration in 1990 of the five new German 
states under an almost un-amended Grundgesetz (the German constitutional 
law), meant that, in principle, opportunities for political participation and 
legal protection for the rights of expression and assembly were equivalent in 
the former East and the former West. Also, at the federal level, the political 
offer was very similar in both regions of Germany right from the early days of 
national unity. Already in March 1990, seven months before reunification, the 
CDU with its “Alliance for Germany” and the SPD had dominated the first (and 
only) free national elections held in the GDR. With the exception of the former 
communist SED/PDS (later renamed Die Linke, ‘the Left’) which remained a 
significant political actor in the East, the party landscape was rapidly unified 
after the transition. Therefore, with the same constitutional guarantees, elec-
toral and party systems on both sides of the former wall, the political opportu-
nity structure for protest can essentially be considered constant.
The second alternative explanation takes into consideration individual fac-
tors that are not specific to new democracies but are known to influence par-
ticipation in protest activities more generally. These individual characteristics, 
when aggregated, generate “compositional effects,” which, if they were not 
controlled for, could lead to the false identification of cohort or period trends 
(Caren et al. 2011:132; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2013:50-51). Resources are one 
important group of factors which should be considered. Previous research has 
shown that political involvement depends on the access to resources – either 
Downloaded from Brill.com10/10/2019 10:09:46AM
via free access
713Generations and Protest in Eastern Germany
Comparative Sociology 17 (2018) 704-737
material (money) or immaterial (time, education, social connections) (Brady, 
Verba, and Schlozman 1995). There is now a general consensus in the litera-
ture that well-connected, educated, and wealthy people are more likely to en-
gage into protest activities. Social connections and education are associated 
with the development of civic skills while wealth provides the independence 
necessary to perform political actions. Without being the product of political 
socialization, cohort differences in protest participation could appear because 
resources are unequally distributed in Eastern and Western Germany.
The contrasted macro-economic policies practiced on the two sides of the 
wall and the uneasy monetary, economic, and social union have left distinct 
socio-economic legacies in the two German regions. During the Cold War, 
West Germany maintained high productivity levels and was more successful 
in sustaining economic growth. At the same time, East Germany maintained a 
policy of full employment with low levels of inequality. Childcare and progres-
sive family models allowed women to be more present in the GDR workforce. 
Both systems – East and West – achieved almost universal literacy rates. At the 
eve of reunification, the transition to a market economy was felt hard in 
the East. Swift privatization of East German state-owned enterprises and, gen-
erally, the lack of economic competitiveness in the region led to a sharp in-
crease in unemployment coupled with massive emigration to the West. Since 
then, economic convergence has progressed, but differences remain (Brenke 
2014). In 1991, East Germans’ primary income per capita was only 42% of that 
of West Germans (excluding Berlin from the ratio). In 2015, it reached 70% 
(Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 2016, 2018). The unemployment 
gap remained high until the mid-2000s, but has sharply declined since then 
(Brenke 2014).
Without downplaying the role of these factors, the strategy employed in 
this study is to assess East-West generational differences after controlling for 
socio-demographic compositions. As discussed below, the survey data used 
in the analysis contains information which captures differences in resources 
between Eastern and Western Germany. The objective is to estimate resi- 
dual cohort differences which subsist after taking into account these socio- 
demographic factors.
5 Empirical Strategy
To measure generational differences in protest participation, we need ap-
propriate empirical data and a modeling strategy that allows for the separate 
estimation of age, period, and cohort (APC) effects. The literature on political 
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behavior suggests that these effects have different sources (see Bartels and 
Jackman 2014). Age effects are a function of aspects of the life-cycle such as 
family structures, physical capacity, or simply cumulated life experience. Pe-
riod effects are produced by structural shocks. For example, we would expect 
an economic downturn or a national election to exert a temporary pressure on 
protest. Finally, cohort effects appear through early socialization and are said 
to remain relatively constant despite advances in age.
5.1 Data
Disentangling these three components requires that we have repeated mea-
sures so that people of the same cohort are observed at different stages of their 
life and at different periods. This study pools data collected in Germany during 
eight rounds of the European Social Survey from 2002 to 2017 (ESS 2017). Over 
15 years, the ESS asked Germans and other European citizens about their po-
litical beliefs, attitudes, and political participation. The eight rounds incorpo-
rated the same core questionnaire which includes questions related to protest 
participation. To facilitate East-West comparisons, the study excludes citizens 
who were not born in Germany.
5.2 Dependent Variables
The ESS asked respondents whether they had taken part in a lawful public 
demonstration, signed a petition, or boycotted certain products during the 
year preceding the survey. These variables are coded as dichotomous. By refer-
ring to the 12 months before the interview, the questions of the ESS efficiently 
capture the temporal variations in the intensity of protest mobilization. The 
three actions differ in terms of difficulty and with regards to their connection 
to the past. Signing a petition and avoiding to buy certain products involves 
lower costs than taking the streets to express political preferences (Rodon and 
Guinjoan 2018). Also, demonstrations, in comparison to the other activities, 
are more deeply rooted in the experience of the transition. If the peaceful revo-
lution did leave a legacy of mobilization in Eastern Germany, we would expect 
this effect to be more visible for demonstrations. Boycotts, in contrast, were 
largely absent from the repertoire of the 1989-90 mobilization and, in Eastern 
Germany, a planned economy made it pretty much impossible to organize or 
join large-scale boycott campaigns.
5.3 Generations, Micro-Cohorts, and Periods
Generations are fundamental building blocks of the theoretical model intro-
duced in this paper. Following Neundorf (2010:1102), I define three political 
generations: 1) the pre-Cold War generation, born before 1929, 2) the Cold War 
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generation, born between 1929 and 1969, and 3) the post-Cold War generation, 
born after 1969. People born before 1920 are excluded from the analysis be-
cause of their limited representation in the dataset. Respondents born after 
1989 cannot be included in the analysis because the ESS did not ask them spe-
cific questions related to their migration within Germany (see below).
The boundaries between the generations are set with regards to the political 
context experienced by citizens during their early formative years. Tradition-
ally, in political socialization research, these years have been situated between 
mid-adolescence and early adulthood. I follow Grasso’s suggested range of 15 
to 25 years old (Grasso 2016:40). Two historical moments separate the three 
generations: first, the creation of the GDR and the FRG in 1949 and, second, 
the reunification of Germany in 1990. A citizen is said to be part of a specific 
generation if he or she has spent the majority of his or her formative years in 
the political context associated with that generation. All Germans aged 20 or 
less in 1949 – that is, born after 1929 – are part of the Cold War generation since 
most of their early formative years (at least 6 out of 11 years) were experienced 
in two separate states. Similarly, citizens aged 20 or less in 1990 – that is, born 
since 1970 – were mainly socialized in a unified Germany.
Although these historical circumstances are well defined in time, the exact 
cut-off points between years of birth remain nonetheless arbitrary. As ex-
plained by Neundorf, ‘[i]n reality the transitions between pre-, post- and Cold 
War generations are seamless’ (2010:1105). For this reason, the three political 
generations serve mainly as theoretical references in the discussion of the 
results. When performing the actual multivariate analysis to estimate cohort 
differences, respondents are classified in 14 five-year birth cohorts (cohort1920: 
1920-24, …, cohort1985: 1985-89). Defining this type of micro-cohorts makes the 
identification of trends less sensible to specific generational thresholds (Caren 
et al. 2011). Finally, periods correspond to each of the two-year rounds of the 
ESS (2002-03, …, 2016-17).
5.4 Growing Up in Eastern Germany
The main independent variable in this study indicates whether respondents 
were socialized in Eastern or Western Germany. This variable goes beyond cod-
ing where the interview took place: it retraces where the respondent grew up, 
even if he or she moved across regions. By leveraging information provided in 
the ESS German country-specific dataset, I can control for East-West migra-
tion within Germany.1 A respondent is said to have been socialized in Eastern 
1   I am able to identify the region in which the respondent was socialized by combining re-
sponses from three questions in the ESS country-specific questionnaire. A first question, 
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Germany (coded ‘1’, otherwise ‘0’) if he or she has spent the majority of his 
or her early formative years (from 15 to 25 years old) in this region. With this 
operationalization, the analysis can sort out the latecomers from the “real” 
East or West Germans.
5.5 Control Variables
As discussed previously, both structural legacies and individual circumstances 
place citizens in various socioeconomic positions with unequal access to re-
sources for mobilization. The effects of these factors have to be isolated from 
those of socialization. The analysis controls for the gender of respondents, 
their age (and age squared), their education level (low, middle, high), their 
employment status (employed or unemployed), the size of their town (from 1: 
“a farm or home in countryside” to 5: “a big city”), and their current or previ-
ous membership in a labor union (yes or no). Based on Oesch’s classification of 
occupations (2006a, 2006b), I also control for membership in five social class-
es: higher-grade service class, lower-grade service class, small business own-
ers, skilled workers, and unskilled workers.2 I include dummies for the states 
(“Länder”) in which respondents live. Some of the 16 German states might 
be outliers, with exceptionally high or low levels of protest. State dummies 
control for structural conditions, such as geography, population density, or 
economic development, that would not be fully captured by individual-level 
variables. Finally, I purposefully do not include variables related to political 
attitudes (e.g. political interest) because these are endogenous to protest. 
Since the questions on political participation are retrospective, the causal rela-
tion between attitudes and behavior might be inverted.
5.6 Statistical Approach
Separating the effects of age, periods, and cohorts in a linear model is prob-
lematic because these three components are perfectly multicollinear, as in 
Equation 1.
cohort = period – age (1)
coded by the interviewer, indicates if the interview was conducted in Eastern or Western 
Germany. A second question asked respondents “Where did you live before 1990?” with two 
possible answers: “in Eastern Germany / East Berlin” or “in Western Germany / West Berlin.” If 
there was a mismatch between the first two questions, indicating that the respondent moved 
across regions, a follow-up question asked “when did you move to the eastern / western part 
of Germany?” With these pieces of information, we can know whether a respondent moved 
across regions and, if so, at what age (given the respondent provided his or her year of birth).
2   I do not control for income since this variable has a very high percentage of missing values.
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I follow Yang and Land (2006, 2008) and perform a series of APC analyses 
with cross-classified random effects models (CCREM). This type of model by-
passes the APC identification problem by specifying period and cohort effects 
as random instead of fixed and additive. Individuals are assumed to be simul-
taneously clustered in cohorts and periods.
CCREMs have been previously used to identify cohort and period effects on 
protest in the United States (Caren et al. 2011) and in Italy (Quaranta 2016). 
Contrary to other studies, however, this paper does not focus on period and 
cohort effects per se but rather on how the effect of one predictor of protest – 
growing up in Eastern Germany – varies across generations and time. This can 
be operationalized by specifying not only random intercepts for cohorts and 
periods, but also a random coefficient for the variable eastsoc, which indicates 
whether a respondent has been socialized in Eastern Germany. We can let this 
coefficient vary across periods and cohorts to model patterns of convergence 
and divergence between Eastern and Western Germany. Equation 2 details the 
hierarchical logistic models used in this study. For each of the three protest 
activities (demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts), I fit two cross-classified 
models: one with a random-slope at the cohort level and one with a random-
slope at the period level.
LogitPr(protestijk) = β0jk + β1age + β2age2 + β3jkeastsoc + zijk (2)
Random intercept
β0jk = γ0 + υ0j + ν0k
Random slope at the cohort level
β3jk = β3j = γ3 + υ3j
Random slope at the period level
β3jk = β3k = γ3 + ν3k
Here, the logit of the probability of having taken part in a protest activity 
during the 12 months preceding the survey is a function of the intercept for 
cohort j and period k (β0jk), the fixed effects of age and age squared (β1 and 
β2), the effect of growing up in Eastern Germany (β3jk), and a vector covari-
ates (zijk). β0jk can be further decomposed into three components: the overall 
intercept (γ0), the random-intercept of cohort j (υoj), and the random-intercept 
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of period k (ν0k). β3jk is a combination of the main effect of eastsoc (γ3), and an 
additional term: either the variation of this coefficient at the cohort level (υ3j) 
or the variation of this coefficient at the period level (ν3k).
6 Findings
The analysis explores whether the protest behavior of East Germans relative 
to West Germans is characterized by a legacy of dictatorship or, conversely, 
by a legacy of transnational mobilization and how this pattern differs across 
cohorts and periods. Hierarchical APC models estimate, for East and West Ger-
mans, the likelihood of having taken part in a protest activity in the 12 months 
preceding each of the eight ESS rounds conducted between 2002 and 2017.
6.1 Fixed Effects
I present full regression tables in the Appendix. Figure 2 shows a summary of 
coefficient sizes with 95% confidence intervals for the fixed part of the models 
Note: Based on CCREM with random slopes at the cohort level.
Figure 2 Coefficient sizes and 95% CIs 
ess 2017
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with a random coefficient at the cohort level (excluding the effects of states). 
The results for the fixed part of the models with a random coefficient at the 
period level are nearly identical and therefore not reported.
For all three political actions, growing up in Eastern Germany has an overall 
negative effect on protest participation. All other things being equal, the odds 
ratios of taking part in a demonstration, signing a petition, and joining in a 
boycott are respectively, 0.75, 0.79, and 0.69 for East Germans in comparison 
with West Germans. Without further analysis, we can therefore already con-
clude that the wide diffusion of protest observed in 1989 and 1990 has not been 
sustained in the 15 years covered by the ESS data. Nowadays, East Germans 
tend to participate less on a yearly basis than their fellow citizens who grew 
up in the West.
Looking at the effect of the other covariates, we see that the assumption that 
resourceful persons have a higher propensity to protest is mostly supported in 
the analysis. Among the indicators of resources, education and union mem-
bership are the two variables which are most consistently associated with pro-
test participation. Educated respondents and union members appear to profit 
from increased civic skills and denser networks of mobilization. Similarly, re-
spondents from more privileged social classes, especially in the service sector, 
tend to be more active in all forms of protest. The effect of unemployment, 
however, is inconsistent across political actions: it is positive for demonstra-
tion attendance, but negative for signing petitions and insignificant for join-
ing in boycotts. As expected, large cities offer a more favorable environment 
for protest, but the relationship between city size and participation appears 
nonlinear and is not significant for boycotts. The effect of gender varies across 
types of protest: men are overrepresented in demonstrations, but women are 
more active in petitions and boycotts. Finally, the effect of age is not signifi-
cant for demonstration attendance. Yet, for the two remaining forms of pro-
test, it is highly significant and follows an inverted U pattern. The effect of age 
is maximized at 38 and 44 years old for participation in petitions and boycott, 
respectively.
6.2 Random Effects
We now turn to the random parts of the models. In general, the variance com-
ponents presented in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix indicate that little 
variation in participation is clustered at the cohort and period levels. Clearly, 
protest measures incorporate a large stochastic variation and part of the intra-
cluster correlations has already been explained by individual-level variables. 
Still, some patterns emerge. For demonstration attendance, variances of the 
cohort and period random intercepts – two measures of the clustering within 
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cohorts and periods in the whole German population – roughly have the same 
magnitude. For petitions and boycotts, however, the cohort effects across Ger-
many are mostly inexistent.
A look at the random slope of eastsoc further reveals how much the effect 
of growing up in Eastern Germany varies across cohorts and periods. Figures 
3 to 5 display the predicted coefficients of the variable measuring whether a 
respondent was socialized in Eastern Germany, combining fixed and random 
effects, across cohorts. The vertical dashed lines delimit the pre-, post-, and 
Cold War generations.
Across all three forms of political participation, the coefficient of eastsoc 
never passes the ‘0’ threshold. The effect of growing up in Eastern Germany on 
demonstration attendance (Figure 3) barely varies across cohorts and remains 
significantly negative at around -0.3 (odds ratio ≈ 0.74). Generational varia-
tion in the eastern participation deficit becomes clearer with petition signing 
(Figure 4). Although no individual random cohort effect is significantly dif-
ferent from the overall fixed effect, the gap between East and West Germans 
Note: Vertical dotted lines indicate the separations between the pre-, post-, and Cold War 
generations. Grey areas show 95% confidence intervals of the predicted random effects.
Figure 3 Effect of socialization in Eastern Germany on demonstration attendance across 
cohorts 
ess 2017
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appears to be maximized for the individuals of the Cold War generation. East 
Germans socialized in-between two generations, born around 1930 and around 
1970, tend to have a slightly smaller protest deficit. A characteristic U-shaped 
trend in the cohort effects is apparent for participation in boycotts (Figure 5). 
East Germans of the Cold War generation born between 1930 and 1960 tend 
to have the lowest propensity to join in boycotts in comparison with West 
Germans of the same cohorts. For these respondents, the effect of growing up 
in Eastern Germany reaches up to -0.5 (odds ratio ≈ 0.61). The East-West gap 
is sharply reduced for the post-Cold War generation, especially for the cohort 
born between 1975 and 1979.
The results of the models with a random coefficient at the period level do 
not indicate that the East-West gap is about to be bridged. Quite the contrary, 
Figures 6 to 8 show that, for two of the three protest activities, the eastern 
deficit in participation has increased over time. Whereas East Germans tended 
to participate as much as West Germans in demonstrations at the beginning 
of the 2000s, a stable participation deficit is apparent since 2008 (Figure 6). A 
similar trend can be observed with petition signing (Figure 7). Here, participa-
tion has plunged for East Germans in 2010 and remains low since then. Finally, 
Note: Vertical dotted lines indicate the separations between the pre-, post-, and Cold 
War generations. Grey areas show 95% confidence intervals of the predicted random 
effects.
Figure 4 Effect of socialization in Eastern Germany on petition signing across 
cohort 
ESS 2017
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Note: Vertical dotted lines indicate the separations between the pre-, post-, and 
Cold War generations. Grey areas show 95% confidence intervals of the 
predicted random effects.
Figure 5 Effect of socialization in Eastern Germany on participation in  
boycotts across cohorts 
ess 2017
Note: Grey areas show 95% confidence intervals of the predicted random effects.
Figure 6 Effect of socialization in Eastern Germany on demonstration  
attendance across periods 
ess 2017
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Note: Grey areas show 95% confidence intervals of the predicted random effects.
Figure 8 Effect of socialization in Eastern Germany on participation in boycotts 
across periods 
ess 2017
Note: Grey areas show 95% confidence intervals of the predicted random effects.
Figure 7 Effect of socialization in Eastern Germany on petition signing across 
periods 
ess 2017
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there is little variation over time in involvement in boycotts (Figure 8): the pre-
dicted random-effects of the coefficient are nearly indistinguishable from the 
fixed effect at -0.38 (odds ratio ≈ 0.68).
All in all, these results indicate that the massive involvement of citizens 
of the GDR during the transition was short-lived. The vast protest experience 
acquired by East Germans from the Cold War generation in 1989 and 1990 has 
not been translated into day-to-day extra-parliamentary participation. Rather 
than a legacy of transitional mobilization, a legacy of autocracy seems to domi-
nate the political landscape in Eastern Germany.
6.3 Robustness Checks
I validate these findings in a set of alternative fixed-effect models. An inter-
esting aspect of estimating relative instead of absolute cohort and period ef-
fects for East and West Germans is that we don’t necessarily need to perform 
full APC models. If we assume that life-cycle effects on protest are the same 
for people who grew up in Eastern and Western Germany, then we can leave 
age out of the equations.3 With only two components, periods and cohorts, 
fixed-effect models can perform as well, if not better, than the random-effect 
ones. The conceptual logic behind this specification is similar to a proportional 
hazards model where a baseline hazard function (here the age effect) remains 
unspecified but is assumed to be the same across groups.
To estimate convergence or divergence in protest participation between 
East and West Germans across generations and time, I model the propensity 
to take part in protest with a series of interaction terms: first, between cohorts 
and the variable measuring whether a respondent was socialized in the East 
and, second, between periods and the same socialization variable.
LogitPr (protest) (3)
3   This assumption is not directly testable. Yet, I can verify that generational differences be-
tween East and West Germans are not artificially produced by unbalanced age groups. To 
do this, I fit a linear regression predicting age by socialization in East Germany, cohorts, and 
periods. The results show that the effect eastsoc is not significant, meaning that there is no 
significant compositional difference in age between East and West Germans once we control 
for cohorts and periods.
= β0 + β1 eastsoc + ∑ αlcohort + ∑ μmperiod
+ ∑ γn (eastsoc ⋅ cohort) + ∑ λ0 (eastsoc ⋅ period) + z
14
l=2
8
m=2
14
n=2
8
0=2
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In Equation 3, the logit of the probability of ever having taken part in a pro-
test activity is the combination of an intercept (β0), the main effect of eastsoc 
(β1), the main effect of the cohort of the respondent (αl), the main effect of 
the period (µm), the interaction of eastsoc with the cohort of the respondent 
(γn), the interaction of eastsoc with the period (λo), and a vector of covariates 
excluding age (z).
Figures A1 to A6 in Appendix show the predicted effect of eastsoc across co-
horts and periods for each protest activity. The results of the fixed effects mod-
els are similar to those of the random effects models. One difference however 
is that, while with the random effect models the negative effect eastsoc is pro-
nounced but varies little around the mean effect across cohorts, with the fixed 
effects models we can observe more variability and a clearer inversed bell-
curve for all the protest activities. The participation deficit of East Germans 
reaches its maximum for some cohorts in the Cold War generation. The effect 
of having been socialized in Eastern Germany is not significant for the pre- and 
post-Cold War generations. The period effects of the fixed effects models are 
almost identical to those of the random effects models except for participation 
in boycotts, where the East-West gap seems to have widened more over time.
In brief, these results tend to confirm the observations made earlier. East 
Germans have a lower propensity to take part in protest activities and, at least 
for certain forms of protest, this gap is accentuated for cohorts of the Cold War 
generation. It is plausible that, after the 1989-90 mobilization, with diminish-
ing returns on political action, citizens in Eastern Germany rapidly developed 
a protest fatigue. From there, old patterns of apathy forged during the GDR 
re-emerged.
7 Conclusions
One of the conditions for the development of a “strong democracy” is that citi-
zens have their say about the way politics is run in between elections (Barber 
1984). In that sense, non-violent protest activities such as demonstrations, pe-
titions, and boycotts constitute “an extension of the citizen’s political action 
repertory within the realm of democratic engagement” (Kaase 2007:793).
In new democracies, legacies of the former autocratic regime can hinder the 
development and normalization of protest. Theories of political socialization 
suggest that citizens who reach political maturity under autocratic regimes 
do not have the chance to fully develop their protest skills and therefore are 
less susceptible to turn to unconventional forms of political participation once 
democracy is established. This perspective, however, does not consider the 
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possibility that mobilization during the transition could counterbalance lega-
cies of the autocratic regime.
This paper has contributed to this discussion by looking at the effects of 
political socialization on the protest behavior of East Germans, a group of citi-
zens who experienced both a long, rigid bureaucratic-authoritarian regime 
and a massive mobilization during the transition to democracy (Kitschelt et al. 
1999). The paper asked whether the peaceful revolution in East Germany could 
have left a positive legacy of mobilization for certain generations of citizens.
Using age-period-cohort models with data from the European Social Sur-
vey, the study compared the participation of East and West Germans in dem-
onstrations, petitions, and boycotts, across generations and time. The results 
indicated that the 1989-90 mobilization did not have a lasting effect. In line 
with more traditional theories of political socialization, East Germans appear 
to have been less active than West Germans in all three forms of protest be-
tween 2002 and 2017. This relative disengagement was particularly visible for 
cohorts of citizens who grew up during the Cold War. The authoritarian regime 
of the GDR appears to have left its mark on political participation in Eastern 
Germany. Nonetheless, the magnitude of the East-West participation gap re-
mains modest and, under certain model specifications, East Germans of the 
post-Cold War generation do not participate significantly less than West Ger-
mans of the same cohorts. Apathy, therefore, is not as pervasive as one might 
fear among East Germans.
Eastern Germany constitutes a single, but emblematic, case of “eventful 
transition” (della Porta 2014). Further research should compare mobilizations 
in new democracies which went through different types of transitions, includ-
ing pacted transitions (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Cross-national studies 
can further improve our understanding of the interrelated effects of legacies of 
autocracy and transition on protest in young democracies.
Protest can be both a symptom of democratic consolidation and a powerful 
tool against democratic backsliding. As we have seen, however, the develop-
ment of unconventional forms of participation is not automatic in new de-
mocracies. The past has a long shadow, and overcoming the legacies of the 
former authoritarian regime might take several decades.
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 Appendices
 Regression Tables
Table A1 APC models of protest participation: random slopes at the cohort level
Demonstration Petition Boycott
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Individual-level variables
East German -0.2881* (0.1284) -0.2362* (0.0920) -0.3719*** (0.1010)
Woman -0.1630** (0.0543) 0.2394*** (0.0328) 0.2527*** (0.0347)
Age (10 years) -0.1779 (0.1490) 0.3864*** (0.0764) 0.6688*** (0.0759)
Age2 -0.0102 (0.0144) -0.0503*** (0.0073) -0.0766*** (0.0072)
Education (ref. = Low)
Middle 0.3022* (0.1278) 0.4042*** (0.0692) 0.4433*** (0.0740)
High 0.7446*** (0.1434) 0.8323*** (0.0819) 0.7854*** (0.0868)
Unemployed 0.3318** (0.1065) -0.1692* (0.0748) -0.1225 (0.0827)
Union member 0.6049*** (0.0590) 0.3097*** (0.0361) 0.2053*** (0.0381)
Town size (ref. = Home in 
countryside)
Country village -0.3958+ (0.2095) -0.1140 (0.1191) -0.1116 (0.1205)
Town or small city -0.0041 (0.2069) -0.0052 (0.1188) -0.0620 (0.1202)
Outskirts of big city 0.1688 (0.2131) 0.0892 (0.1237) 0.0406 (0.1253)
A big city 0.4841* (0.2122) 0.2466* (0.1243) 0.1671 (0.1263)
Social class (ref. = High 
service class)
Low service class -0.0423 (0.0846) -0.0446 (0.0553) -0.1743** (0.0573)
Small business owners -0.2418* (0.1163) -0.1854** (0.0697) -0.0320 (0.0710)
Skilled workers -0.3623*** (0.0903) -0.4360*** (0.0565) -0.5391*** (0.0591)
Unskilled workers -0.5135*** (0.1181) -0.6271*** (0.0703) -0.6871*** (0.0742)
State fixed effects (ref. = 
Baden-Württemberg)
Bavaria -0.1724 (0.1153) 0.2140** (0.0678) -0.1529* (0.0674)
Berlin 0.2032 (0.1512) 0.2216* (0.1058) -0.3345** (0.1087)
Brandenburg 0.4690** (0.1702) 0.2455* (0.1141) -0.6207*** (0.1211)
Bremen 0.0095 (0.2751) -0.0517 (0.1905) 0.0138 (0.1880)
Hamburg 0.0927 (0.1956) -0.0468 (0.1402) -0.3636* (0.1421)
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Table A1 APC models of protest participation: random slopes at the cohort level (cont.)
Demonstration Petition Boycott
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Hesse -0.0985 (0.1401) -0.0450 (0.0850) -0.2668** (0.0844)
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern
0.2125 (0.1897) 0.0639 (0.1236) -0.8503*** (0.1364)
Lower Saxony -0.2038 (0.1337) -0.1904* (0.0789) -0.4014*** (0.0778)
North Rhine- 
 Westphalia
-0.3619*** (0.1084) -0.1273* (0.0648) -0.4023*** (0.0642)
Rhineland-Palatinate -0.3514* (0.1788) -0.1388 (0.0974) -0.3926*** (0.0968)
Saarland -0.6643+ (0.4001) -0.2871 (0.1938) -0.1515 (0.1843)
Saxony 0.0480 (0.1687) -0.0634 (0.1106) -0.6179*** (0.1154)
Saxony-Anhalt -0.1591 (0.1898) 0.2297+ (0.1174) -0.9347*** (0.1303)
Schleswig-Holstein 0.0051 (0.1767) 0.1690 (0.1060) -0.2915** (0.1077)
Thuringia 0.0654 (0.1853) 0.2262+ (0.1177) -0.6202*** (0.1260)
Intercept -1.4831*** (0.4347) -1.5968*** (0.2426) -1.9253*** (0.2581)
Variance (period:  
 intercept)
0.0148 (0.0104) 0.0190 (0.0106) 0.0704 (0.0364)
Variance (cohort: slope) 0.0019 (0.0121) 0.0105 (0.0096) 0.0235 (0.0167)
Variance (cohort:  
 intercept)
0.0198 (0.0127) 0.0013 (0.0022) 0.0000 (0.0000)
BIC 10829.2 23236.1 21439.0
N (periods) 8 8 8
N (cohorts) 14 14 14
N (individuals) 18722 18683 18689
Note: Significance: + p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Results with logit estimates and  
standard errors.
source: ess 2017.
Downloaded from Brill.com10/10/2019 10:09:46AM
via free access
733Generations and Protest in Eastern Germany
Comparative Sociology 17 (2018) 704-737
Table A2 APC models of protest participation: random slopes at the period level
Demonstration Petition Boycott
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Individual-level variables
East German -0.3151* (0.1459) -0.2542** (0.0986) -0.3792*** (0.0929)
Woman -0.1637** (0.0543) 0.2371*** (0.0328) 0.2498*** (0.0346)
Age (10 years) -0.1829 (0.1470) 0.3595*** (0.0680) 0.6284*** (0.0704)
Age2 -0.0093 (0.0142) -0.0480*** (0.0065) -0.0740*** (0.0068)
Education (ref. = Low)
Middle 0.3001* (0.1279) 0.4024*** (0.0692) 0.4448*** (0.0740)
High 0.7442*** (0.1436) 0.8259*** (0.0819) 0.7791*** (0.0867)
Unemployed 0.3104** (0.1069) -0.1844* (0.0748) -0.1310 (0.0826)
Union member 0.5937*** (0.0589) 0.2987*** (0.0356) 0.1840*** (0.0372)
Town size (ref. = Home in 
countryside)
Country village -0.4020+ (0.2096) -0.1192 (0.1192) -0.1124 (0.1205)
Town or small city -0.0063 (0.2070) -0.0013 (0.1189) -0.0602 (0.1203)
Outskirts of big city 0.1613 (0.2132) 0.0940 (0.1237) 0.0437 (0.1253)
A big city 0.4849* (0.2123) 0.2488* (0.1244) 0.1713 (0.1263)
Social class (ref. = High  
service class)
Low service class -0.0396 (0.0847) -0.0426 (0.0553) -0.1743** (0.0573)
Small business owners -0.2401* (0.1164) -0.1870** (0.0696) -0.0334 (0.0709)
Skilled workers -0.3584*** (0.0905) -0.4356*** (0.0565) -0.5411*** (0.0590)
Unskilled workers -0.5078*** (0.1182) -0.6257*** (0.0702) -0.6895*** (0.0742)
State fixed effects (ref. = 
Baden-Württemberg)
Bavaria -0.1737 (0.1153) 0.2112** (0.0678) -0.1549* (0.0674)
Berlin 0.2062 (0.1513) 0.2180* (0.1059) -0.3385** (0.1086)
Brandenburg 0.4918** (0.1707) 0.2614* (0.1143) -0.6204*** (0.1216)
Bremen 0.0095 (0.2751) -0.0520 (0.1907) 0.0145 (0.1881)
Hamburg 0.0906 (0.1955) -0.0422 (0.1403) -0.3620* (0.1422)
Hesse -0.0977 (0.1400) -0.0456 (0.0851) -0.2642** (0.0845)
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern
0.2220 (0.1900) 0.0677 (0.1235) -0.8545*** (0.1363)
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Table A2 APC models of protest participation: random slopes at the period level (cont.)
Demonstration Petition Boycott
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Lower Saxony -0.1989 (0.1337) -0.1890* (0.0789) -0.4000*** (0.0779)
North Rhine-Westphalia -0.3592*** (0.1084) -0.1280* (0.0648) -0.4021*** (0.0643)
Rhineland-Palatinate -0.3483+ (0.1788) -0.1377 (0.0975) -0.3920*** (0.0968)
Saarland -0.6599+ (0.4000) -0.2859 (0.1940) -0.1467 (0.1844)
Saxony 0.0617 (0.1690) -0.0579 (0.1106) -0.6197*** (0.1156)
Saxony-Anhalt -0.1538 (0.1901) 0.2348* (0.1175) -0.9423*** (0.1305)
Schleswig-Holstein 0.0024 (0.1767) 0.1665 (0.1061) -0.2893** (0.1078)
Thuringia 0.0750 (0.1858) 0.2312* (0.1178) -0.6249*** (0.1262)
Intercept -1.4744*** (0.4305) -1.5158*** (0.2273) -1.7858*** (0.2468)
Variance (cohort: intercept) 0.0196 (0.0123) 0.0005 (0.0017) 0.0000 (0.0000)
Variance (period: slope) 0.0392 (0.0298) 0.0173 (0.0132) 0.0032 (0.0073)
Variance (period: intercept) 0.0157 (0.0122) 0.0279 (0.0156) 0.0754 (0.0393)
BIC 10822.1 23232.2 21445.7
N (cohorts) 14 14 14
N (periods) 8 8 8
N (individuals) 18722 18683 18689
Note: Significance: + p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Results with logit estimates and  
standard errors.
source: ess 2017.
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 Fixed Effects Models: Figures
Note: Based on fixed effects model with interaction terms. Vertical dotted lines 
indicate the separations between the pre-, post-, and Cold War generations.  
Grey areas show 95% confidence intervals of the fixed effects.
Figure A1 Effect of socialization in Eastern Germany on demonstration  
attendance across cohorts 
ess 2017
Note: Based on fixed effects model with interaction terms. Vertical dotted lines 
indicate the separations between the pre-, post-, and Cold War generations. 
Grey areas show 95% confidence intervals of the fixed effects.
Figure A2 Effect of socialization in Eastern Germany on petition signing 
across cohorts 
ess 2017
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Note: Based on fixed effects model with interaction terms. Grey areas show 95% 
confidence intervals of the fixed effects.
Figure A4 Effect of socialization in Eastern Germany on demonstration  
attendance across periods 
ESS 2017
Note: Based on fixed effects model with interaction terms. Vertical dotted lines  
indicate the separations between the pre-, post-, and Cold War generations. Grey 
areas show 95% confidence intervals of the fixed effects.
Figure A3 Effect of socialization in Eastern Germany on participation in boycotts 
across cohorts 
ESS 2017
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Note: Based on fixed effects model with interaction terms. Grey areas show 95%  
confidence intervals of the fixed effects.
Figure A6 Effect of socialization in Eastern Germany on participation in boycotts  
across periods 
ESS 2017
Note: Based on fixed effects model with interaction terms. Grey areas show 95% 
confidence intervals of the fixed effects.
Figure A5 Effect of socialization in Eastern Germany on petition signing across 
periods 
ESS 2017
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